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The Instrumental Case for Corporate Diversity
Naomi Cahn, June Carbone, and Nancy Levit
Forthcoming in 40 JOURNAL OF LAW & INEQUALITY ___ (2022).

A growing body of evidence indicates that diverse businesses outperform those with less
diversity. These findings have fueled calls for mandating diversity on corporate boards and for
undertaking greater efforts to ensure diversity in the corporate ranks. The question of where
diversity fits in a corporate reform agenda, however, has yet to clearly defined. Doing so requires
resolving the following issues.
First, why does greater diversity appear to be correlated with better performance?
Innumerable studies find that more diverse companies do better. The critics correctly observe that
the “diverse companies do better” studies do not prove that simply adding diversity causes the
improvement; instead, they posit that the improvement is likely to be “endogenous,” that is, the
factors that encourage and sustain diversity, such as greater transparency,1 also improve financial
performance, and the variables may interact in multifaceted ways.2 We argue that an examination
of the ways in which the variables that affect diversity and those associated with improved business
performance interact provides a basis for what we call “the instrumental case for diversity.” If the
same factors that correlate with greater diversity also correlate with improved performance, then
greater diversity can be a benchmark for better corporate management. It can make diversity
metrics a tool (though not necessarily an exclusive or necessary tool) in measuring the reform of
dysfunctional corporate cultures. Diversity might then become part of an iterative process;
maintaining diversity will require management reforms such as greater transparency that will in
turn fuel transformations in management cultures that further both greater diversity and better
overall performance.3
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1
A comprehensive NASDAQ report, for example, found that “gender-diverse boards or audit committees are
associated with: more transparent public disclosures and less information asymmetry; better reporting discipline by
management; a lower likelihood of manipulated earnings through earnings management; an increased likelihood of
voluntarily disclosing forward-looking information; a lower likelihood of receiving audit qualifications due to errors,
non-compliance or omission of information; and a lower likelihood of securities fraud.” NASDAQ, SEC filing (2020),
https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/assets/RuleBook/Nasdaq/filings/SR-NASDAQ-2020-081.pdf. Cf. Stephen Miller,
Transparency Shrinks Gender Pay Gap, SHRM (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hrtopics/compensation/Pages/transparency-shrinks-gender-pay-gap.aspx.
2
On the meaning of business performance, see infra text at notes 5, 93-98.
3
See, e.g., Yaron Nili, Beyond the Numbers: Substantive Gender Diversity in Boardrooms, 94 IND. L.J. 145 (2019)
(arguing that when women serve on corporate boards, their tenure is shorter than that of their male counterparts, they
are overextended, and they lack clout). Reversing these patterns can serve as a metric for genuine corporate reform.
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The second question is also a puzzle: if greater diversity correlates with better business
performance, then why has it taken so long for companies to embrace it, and what accounts for the
persistence of largely white male boards and upper management? The answer could be path
dependence: a largely white and male management team may not recognize the importance of
greater diversity or how to accomplish it. The existing literature on privilege, unconscious bias,
and microaggressions emphasizes these factors, and diversity training has been designed to address
them, albeit with limited success.4 The persistent lack of diversity, however, may be more
explicable as a design feature of flawed management practices. A 2020 Nasdaq report, for
example, links greater diversity to the lesser incidence of opaque governance procedures, earnings
management, weak internal controls, and securities fraud.5 Other studies find that lack of diversity
is often associated with indifferent, harassing, or bullying bosses.6 What these negative workplace
attributes have in common is that they can also be used to enhance top executive power and
compensation at the expense of other corporate objectives.7 The instrumental case for diversity
maintains that where such attributes, which involve conflicts of interest between top management
and longer-term company interests, exist, an emphasis on greater diversity is also likely to make
it easier to root out such practices.
The third question involves how our instrumental case relates to the moral and more
traditional business cases for diversity. The simple answer is that the moral case treats diversity
as an end in itself, a necessary part of a just society.8 The traditional business case for diversity
maintains that, even if diversity is not morally or legally compelled, it is a positive good that
businesses should embrace because it will promote their own financial interests.9 The instrumental
Indeed, Mike Selmi questions just how “unconscious” unconscious bias is. Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit
Bias and a Plea for a New Narrative, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 193, 197-98 (2018) (“Rather than defining implicit bias as
unconscious and uncontrollable . . . it should be treated as one possible step, usually the initial step, in a more elaborate
deliberative process.”). See also Jessica Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505 (2018)(exploring the ways in
which courts overlook explicit bias and accept justifications for it); Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev , Why Doesn't
Diversity Training Work?: The Challenge for Industry and Academia, 10 ANTHROPOLOGY NOW, Sept. 2018, at 48,
49, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/dobbin/files/an2018.pdf (“There is ample evidence that training alone does not
change attitudes or behavior, or not by much and not for long. In their re-view of 985 studies of antibias interventions,
Paluck and Green found little evidence that training reduces bias. In their review of 31 organizational studies using
pretest/posttest assessments or a control group, Kulik and Roberson identified 27 that documented im-proved
knowledge of, or attitudes toward, diversity, but most found small, short-term improvements on one or two of the
items measured. In their review of 39 similar studies, Bezrukova, Joshi and Jehn identified only five that examined
long-term effects on bias, two showing positive effects, two negative, and one no effect.”).
5
Nasdaq, supra note 1.
6
See Jennifer L. Berdahl et al., Work as a Masculinity Contest, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 422, 422 (2018); Kenneth Matos et
al., Toxic Leadership and the Masculinity Contest Culture: How “Win or Die” Cultures Breed Abusive Leadership,
74 J. SOC. ISSUES 422, 502-3 (2018); Shannon L. Rawski & Angela Workman-Stark, Masculinity Contest Cultures in
Policing Organizations and Recommendations for Training Interventions, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 607 (2018).
7
See, e.g., June Carbone & William K. Black, The Problem with Predators, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 441 (2020)
(describing how CEOs acquire greater power vis-à-vis boards by producing short term earnings gains).
8
See David Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good For Business”: The Rise of
Market-Based Diversity Arguments and The Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1599-1600
(2004).
9
See, e.g., Douglas E. Brayley & Eric S. Nguyen, Good Business: A Market-Based Argument for Law Firm Diversity,
34 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 2 (2009).
4
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case we are making in this article exists alongside the moral and business cases. It argues that the
promotion of diversity can in some cases become a tool for advancing corporate interests separate
from diversity itself. The business case for diversity suggests, for example, that greater diversity
may be beneficial in appealing to a more diverse customer base or in recruiting employees who
prefer to work in diverse environments. The instrumental case, in contrast, suggests that diversity
may also be useful in countering illegal or unethical practices that require a carefully selected
crony network to stay hidden.10 Such an argument does not replace the moral or business cases; it
brackets them. Instead, it suggests a more fine-tuned analysis should regard the presence or
absence of diversity as a signal tied to specific management practices.
To give an example of the difference, consider the traditional obstacles to diversity:
women’s greater family responsibilities or an emphasis on pathways into the executive suite that
have historically not been open to underrepresented minorities or women. The moral case for
diversity maintains that firms have an obligation to devise ways to overcome these obstacles. The
business case suggests firms should reconsider whether it is in their interests to continue to
maintain such narrow pathways to advancement, trading off traditional notions of merit for more
representative inclusion of different groups. The instrumental case, instead, asks whether the
presumed advantages of these factors are real. In the case of the emphasis on long hours at work,
for example, a growing literature suggests the emphasis on long hours may result less from
employer needs and more from an emphasis on zero sum (or often negative sum) competition that
becomes an end in itself.11 The three rationales may come together to question the emphasis on
long or unpredictable work schedules as a barrier to the greater inclusion of women; the
instrumental case, however, focuses greater attention on when and how such an emphasis is
counterproductive.
This article will provide a framework for answering these questions by examining changes
in business practices over the last forty years. During that time period, large corporations have
shifted from the era of the “corporation man,” which featured large, secure, predictable, and largely
homogenous business environments, to the era of the “tournament,” that is, business environments
that place greater emphasis on internal competition and short-term measures of performance. The
article will suggest that tournament-like workplaces make it harder to maintain diversity – and
often produce worse business outcomes. This analysis will lay the foundation for a deeper inquiry
into the relationship between diversity and corporate reform.
The focus of this article is on diversity among the corporate officers and directors who
manage corporations. Outside of management, corporations often have no diversity “problems;”

10

See, e.g. Kristin N. Johnson, Banking on Diversity: Does Gender Diversity Improve Financial Firms' Risk
Oversight?, 70 SMU L. REV. 327, 376 (2017) (describing the value of diversity in valuing groupthink); Cf. Carbone
& Black, supra note 7, at 460 (describing the way white collar criminals create seeming legitimacy for their predatory
business practices); June Carbone, Naomi Cahn, & Nancy Levit, Women, Rule-Breaking, and the Triple Bind, 87 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2019) (hereinafter “The Triple Bind”) (“companies use intensely competitive bonus
systems to produce insular “young boys' clubs” that promote a culture of rule-breaking; that is, the management
systems deliberately and instrumentally select for alpha males who will flout the laws that stand in the way of these
otherwise profitable business models.”).
11
Naomi
Cahn,
Where
Are
All
the
Women
Leaders?,
FORBES
(Mar.
3,
2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/naomicahn/2020/03/03/where-are-all-the-women-leaders/?sh=6290f2462ee7.

3

indeed, the problem is instead that lower-wage jobs are more likely to be filled by women and
people of color.12
I.

Diversity and Corporate Tournaments

Over the last several decades, the prevailing corporate ethos has become one of shareholder
primacy; that is, a focus on short-term increases in share price to the exclusion of other
considerations. A growing critique maintains that too great an emphasis on short-term metrics is
ultimately bad for business. In addition, a different critique to which we have contributed argues
that the practices associated with shareholder primacy, such as high stakes bonus pay, have also
tended to drive women out.13 The common denominator in these two critiques is the emergence
of winner take all rewards; those calling the shots reorient institutions so that the CEO, influential
shareholders, and a select group associated with the boss take a disproportionate share of the
company’s resources, often at the expense of other employees, customers, and the company’s longterm health. In the section, we will, describe the changes and explain why they may undercut long
term business performance. Then, we will consider why they may also be associated with less
diversity. Considering the circumstances in which these factors may simultaneously undermine
the company prospects and the inclusion of women may offer new insights into the instrumental
case for diversity.
A. Shareholder Primacy, Short-Termism, and Corporate Boards
An overarching change in corporate management since the 1980’s is the reorientation of
publicly traded companies to emphasize short-term gains in share-price.14 This shift can be
thought of as involving three components: an insistence that officers and directors consider
shareholder interests to the exclusion of other stakeholders such as customers and employees, an
alignment of executive and shareholder interests through a restructuring of top executive pay to
place greater emphasis on stock options, and, as a consequence of the first two changes, greater
pressure on CEOs to produce short-term results.15 Each of these factors, both individually and
collectively, has been the subject of extensive management critiques for reasons unrelated to
diversity.

See Noreen Ahmed, Exposing Wage Theft Without Fear Is Possible and Necessary, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Sept.
16, 2019), https://www.nelp.org/blog/exposing-wage-theft-without-fear-possible-necessary/ [https://perma.cc/8T6Z6GR4]; Martha Ross & Nicole Bateman, Metro. Pol'y Program, Meet the Low-Wage Workforce EE 9, BROOKINGS
(2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/up-loads/2019/11/201911_Brookings-Metro_low-wageworkforce_Ross-Bateman.pdf [https://perma.cc/U24P-QQEJ].
13
See June Carbone, Naomi Cahn, & Nancy Levit, Gender and the Tournament: Reinventing Antidiscrimination Law
in an Age of Inequality, 96 TEX. L. REV. 425 (2018); Carbone, Cahn, & Levit, supra note 10, the Triple Bind.
14
See June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 963, 966, 1003 (2017).
15
Carbone & Black, supra note 7, at 463–64 (“to better align management and shareholder interests, top management
compensation packages began to emphasize incentive pay tied overwhelmingly to stock options. Between 1993 and
2014, the percentage of CEO compensation attributable to incentive pay increased from 35% to 85%, and CEOs also
faced greater risk of dismissal if share prices did not increase. The overall disparities in the pay of top executives at
the same company increased, and between 1981 and 2013, the pay ratio between CEOs and average wage workers
grew from 42:1 to 331:1”).
12

4

First, while shareholder interests can be diverse, shareholder primacy has tended to identify
shareholder interests with short-term fluctuations in share price. This has been true for a number
of reasons. The most immediate is that corporate boards measure CEO success in terms of their
ability to generate earnings, which in turn push up share price. 16 They exercise oversight in the
name of protecting shareholder interests.17 As a practical matter therefore, a CEO who has a strong
initial run “creates greater autonomy by both enhancing his bargaining position over time and
increasing the cognitive commitment of the board to him.”18 A decline in share price on the other
hand can and has led to the CEO’s termination.19 Enforcing the system have been activist hedge
funds that are waiting in the wings, ready to buy up stock, acquire board membership and push
through changes that boost the value of their typically short-term investments in the company.20
Second, to better align management and shareholder short-term interests, a higher
proportion of CEO pay is now tied to stock options that increase in value with reported earnings.21
This increases the incentives for CEOs to focus their efforts on boosting short term earnings and
share prices.22 CEOs, in turn, have implemented bonus pay systems for top executives that align
executive incentives with CEO objectives.23 Critics allege that high stakes bonus pay has been
associated with earnings management, accounting irregularities, increased use of stock buybacks,
16

See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals
About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 295 (2004) (noting
that the “preference of the firm’s current shareholders is for increasing profitability reflected in either dividends or
stock price, which sometimes is aided by concealing the truth rather than revealing it.”); id. at 313.
17
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
547, 564 (2003). “[W]hile most of the operational decision-making can be, and is, delegated to management, the
board is still required to be an active participant in some of the more important managerial business decisions, such
as mergers, stock issuance, and changes to company governance documents.” Yaron Nili, Horizontal Directors, 114
NW. U. L. REV. 1179, 1188 (2020).
18
Langevoort, supra note 16, at 313.
19
See Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregory D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation
Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 695 (2011) (indicating that CEO terminations can be linked to share price
performance);
20
See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds,
37 J. CORP. L. 51, 75, 80–82 (2011) (noting that a high percentage of publicly traded companies experience pressure
to increase short term earnings because of the role of hedge funds and other activist investors). As Virginia Harper
Ho notes, however, there are two other camps of shareholder activists: “public pension funds, labor unions, religious
orders, and individual “gadflies,” whose activism has often aligned with particular values and interests [and]
mainstream institutional investors like Vanguard and Fidelity [that] have generally voted with management. From
Public Policy to Materiality: Non-Financial Reporting, Shareholder Engagement, and Rule 14a-8's Ordinary
Business Exception, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1236 (2019).
21
See Carbone & Black, supra note 7, at 444, 465-66.
22
See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 320-21
(2012) (describing how executive compensation increases emphasis on short-term increases in share price).
23
Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors
for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 37 (2003)(hereinafter Enron)
(describing how Enron management used its bonus system to reorient company behavior in counterproductive and
unethical ways): See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of “Pay for
Performance”, 39 J. CORP. L. 525, 534 (2014) (describing bonus systems and concluding that they are associated with
.”earning manipulations, accounting frauds, and excessive risk-taking.”)
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and outright fraud.24 Indeed, a major advantage of such bonuses systems is that they allow CEOs
to emphasize their desired metrics while looking the other way at how subordinates achieve their
results.25 Critics call the system “plausible deniability” as executives can use bonuses to signal
the desired behavior without complicity in the resulting illegal, unethical, or shortsighted tactics
that executives use to produce results.26 The association of modern executive compensation with
abusive practices has become sufficiently widespread that some of the original supporters of the
move to bonus pay have withdrawn their support.27
Third, the single-minded focus on short-term shareholder primacy has led to concern about
the effect on other stakeholders. For example, large investors like Blackrock have begun to pay
greater attention to environmental issues, reasoning that climate change may affect the world
economy more generally in ways that share price fluctuations in individual companies may not
reflect.28
Taken together, the combination of a short-term focus, the use of incentive to disguise CEO
objectives and company health, and the failure to recognize more generalized challenges to global
markets have persuaded many critics that corporate reform is in order. These critics observe that
CEOs can often produce an immediate boost in share prices by cutting labor costs through layoffs
or reductions in training, slashing investment in research and equipment, engaging in stock
buybacks, or concealing negative information.29 All of these actions have been known to increase
24

See Shane A. Johnson, Harley E. Ryan, Jr. & Yisong S. Tian, Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The
Sources of Incentives Matter, 13 REV. FIN. 115, 115 (2009) (observing that managers with larger linear incentives
may be more likely to commit fraud in an attempt to avoid severe price declines): Sharon Hannes & Avraham
Tabbach, Executive Stock Options: The Effects of Manipulation on Risk Taking, 38 J. CORP. L. 533, 545 (2013)
(discussing the link between executive incentive compensation, excessive risk taking, and the pressure to manipulate
reported outcomes to influence share price); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002) (arguing that executive ability to set
compensation facilitates the ability to benefit from short-term and “rent extraction” strategies)
25
See Carbone & Black, supra note 7, at 461-62,
26
See Charles W. Calomiris, The Subprime Turmoil: What’s Old, What’s New, and What’s Next, J. STRUCTURED FIN.,
Spring 2009, at 6, 16 (describing how plausible deniability allowed those overseeing mortgage-backed securities to
escape accountability during the financial crisis). See also Carbone, Cahn, & Levit, Gender and the Tournament,
supra note 13, at 1159.
27
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the
Problems, and How to Fix Them 44-45 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 44, 2004),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305 (discussing how equity-based compensation led to unwise acquisitions, increased
risk, aggressive accounting, and even corporate fraud).
28
See Michal Barzuza et. al., Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund Esg Activism and the New Millennial Corporate
Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1274 (2020) (describing how Black Rock started to emphasize environmental
considerations, including the impact of climate disruption and potential regulatory reactions, in its portfolio as early
as 2015).
29
Langevoort, supra note 16, at 295 (observing that the “preference of the firm's current shareholders is for increasing
profitability reflected in either dividends or stock price, which sometimes is aided by concealing the truth rather than
revealing it.”). See also Dallas, supra note 22, at 280 (describing CEO willingness to research, development, and
marketing even if it would hurt the firm’s medium to long term prospects). William Lazonick calls stock buybacks
“weapons of value destruction” and argues executives who make these corporate allocation decisions use stock
buybacks to boost their companies’ stock prices and manage quarterly earnings “because, through their stock-based

6

short-term share prices; all have the potential to threaten companies’ medium to long term
interests.30 The Corporate Roundtable and other influential actors have started to back away from
that short-term shareholder focus, arguing that it is economically destructive.31
In addition, some investors now pay increased attention to environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) factors. Moody’s Investment Service announced in 2020 that it expected ESG
considerations “to be of growing importance” in its assessment of issuer credit quality.” Moody’s
analysts wrote, “While our ratings have always reflected our views of ESG risks, the materiality
of key environmental and social issues continues to increase.”32 ESG investing often combines
two different motives: some funds market ESG investments in an effort to appeal to socially
conscious investors.33 Other investors emphasizing ESG factors maintain that share prices do not
fully take into account medium to long term risks arising from greater societal inequality, potential
regulatory responses to inequitable business practices, or the inevitable transition to new energy
sources.34
pay, they are personally incentivized to make these allocation decisions.” See William Lazonick, The Financialization
of the U.S. Corporation: What Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be Regained, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 857, 888 (2013).
30
Carbone, Cahn, & Levit, The Triple Bind, supra note 10, at 1115. See also Mark Desjardine & Rodolphe Durand,
Activist
Hedge
Funds:
Good
for
Some,
Bad
for
Others?,
HEC
(Mar.
26,
2021),
https://www.hec.edu/en/knowledge/articles/activist-hedge-funds-good-some-badothers#:~:text=While%20we%20typically%20think%20of,with%20an%20aim%20to%20make (showing that while
such strategies boost share price in the short run, they depress it over time).
31
Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans,’
BUS. ROUNDTABLE
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-thepurpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans; Statement on the Purpose of a
Corporation (2019, updated 2021), https://system.businessroundtable.org/app/uploads/sites/5/2021/02/BRTStatement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-Feburary-2021-compressed.pdf. Martin Lipton (of Wachtell Lipton)
argued at the World Economic Forum in 2016 that “A short-term mindset in managing and investing in businesses
has become pervasive and is profoundly destructive to the long-term health of the economy.” The New Paradigm A
Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve
Sustainable
Long-Term
Investment
and
Growth
(2016),
https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.25960.16.pdf. See also Nadelle Grossman, Turning a
Short-Term Fling into a Long-Term Commitment: Board Duties in a New Era, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 905, 906
(2010) (“[B]oard short-termism also seems to be due to some investors with short investment horizons who use
activism to influence boards to make decisions that yield short-term returns despite the longer-term impairing effects
those decisions might have on the corporate enterprise.”)
32
David Caleb Mutua, ESG Is Increasingly Important in Credit Ratings, Moody’s Says, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 14, 2020
8:19 AM, CDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-14/esg-is-increasingly-important-in-creditratings-moody-s-says.
33
Id. (emphasizing that millennials are much more socially conscious and that the competition to attract them is
intense.).
34
See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and
Economics of Esg Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 398 (2020) (distinguishing between the different
motivations and arguing that what they terms “risk-return ESG” analysis of a fossil fuel company might conclude that
the company's litigation and regulatory risks are underestimated by its share price, and explain that a “risk-return ESG
analysis of a fossil fuel company might conclude that the company's litigation and regulatory risks are underestimated
by its share price.”). See also Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV.
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The rise in ESG investing also produces greater emphasis on diversity.35 Particularly in
the wake of #MeToo and Black Lives Matter protests, the failure to attend to diversity issues can
be a risk factor for major companies on the same order as energy transition and accounting
irregularities. But, as we will show below, it also provides a farther-reaching barometer of
corporate governance issues.
B. Toxic Management Drives Women Out
In the shareholder primacy era, management styes have changed in ways that make
diversity hard to maintain. CEOs have become more likely to be hired from outside a company,
and CEO tenure has declined.36 Given the pressure to accomplish quick results, CEOs may adopt
top-down management systems, the use of reductionist metrics to measure success, or high stakes
bonus systems that incentivize management priorities.37 The CEO’s focus, especially a CEO
coming from outside the company or one with a mandate to produce immediate results, may be on
how to gain control of what can be large, sprawling, and bureaucratic institutions. The goal may
be to outflank the established players in the organization to find those willing to put the CEO’s
priorities first, especially where the CEO seeks to slash expenses, cut employment, or shake up the
corporate mission. High stakes bonus systems can be an attractive way to do so.
Jack Welch, the GE CEO identified with the modern era of corporate management, was a
master in imposing his will on a large bureaucracy. He developed an innovative management
training program that regularly moved executives from division to division, and an executive
compensation system that introduced high stake bonuses.38 The company regularly ranked the
companies’ employees against each other, identifying perhaps twenty percent or so who were
groomed for promotion and notifying the bottom ten percent that they were at risk of dismissal.39
He repeated the process each year, rewarding some with stock options that could be incredibly
lucrative as the company’s share price increased, and encouraging the ever changing group
receiving low marks to consider other employment. For a time, his system proved incredibly

1401, 1401–02 (2020)(concluding that “[s]ocial risk has proven highly destructive for corporate value even when the
company's key failure is not violating laws, as the recent crises at Facebook and Uber demonstrate.”).
35
See, e.g., Veronica Root Martinez & Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Equality Metrics, __ YALE L.J. __ ,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3772895 (forthcoming 2021); See also Afra Afsharipour, Bias,
Identity and M&A, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 471, 488; Lisa Fairfax, All on Board? Board Diversity Trends Reflect Signs of
Promise and Concern, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2018); Michal Barzuza et. al., Shareholder Value(s):
Index Fund Esg Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1265 (2020)
(observing that “index funds are typically reticent followers when it comes to corporate governance reforms, but when
the subject matter of activism turns from conventional governance reforms to demands for increased gender diversity
on boards, index funds have been notably outspoken, both in communications directed primarily at corporate managers
and in marketing efforts directed at the general public.”)
36
Carbone & Levit, supra note 14, at 1002 n.196.
37
Carbone, Cahn & Levit, The Triple Bind, supra note 10, at 1109-15.
38
Jack Welch, Jack Welch: ‘Rank-and-Yank’? That’s Not How It’s Done, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/8216rankandyank8217-that8217s-not-how-it8217s-done-1384473281.
39
See NAOMI CAHN, JUNE CARBONE, & NANCY LEVIT, SHAFTED: WHY WOMEN LOSE IN A WINNER-TAKE-ALL WORLD
___ (forthcoming 2021 Simon & Schuster); Welch, supra note 38.
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influential, with over half of publicly traded companies in America adopting it.40 The specific
system has since fallen out of favor; still, variable pay remains the norm, with bonus pay in the
form of stock options or year-end cash grants often dwarfing base pay for higher level employees
in tech, finance and other fields.41 Such awards, as Jack Welch emphasized, allow corporate CEOs
to incentivize their priorities.
Introducing such high-stakes bonus systems changes firm dynamics. Lynne Dallas
observes that such systems, particularly where employees feel they are in competition with each
other, produces a greater emphasis on self-interest, higher levels of distrust that undermine
teamwork, greater homogeneity in the selection of corporate management, less managerial
accountability and more politicized decision-making. 42 In short, “supposedly meritocratic bonus
systems have been found to replicate many of the attributes of ‘old boys clubs’ that protect insiders
at the expense of outsiders.”43
Even without the extremes of an Enron or a GE, competitive workplaces can lead to
“masculinity contest cultures”44 that pit employees against each other in high stakes, negative sum
competition, that often lower morale and increasing turnover.45 Such cultures emphasize the
internal competition between employees, including, for example, an emphasis on long hours as
proof of devotion to the firm, over more job-related performance measures.46 These cultures often
select for bosses who thrive in such competitive environments and bully or harass their
subordinates, particularly women and less traditional men.47 Where such cultures take hold,
turnover, sexual harassment, and demoralization increase – and diversity may be harder to
maintain. 48
Critics of performance pay emphasize that these systems also change the characteristics of
the employees who rise to the top. Such systems become more likely to select for narcissism and
overconfidence bias and less likely to select for humility, honesty, or empathy.49 Studies find that
40

Alan Murray, Should I Rank My Employees?, WALL ST. J. GUIDES, http://guides.wsj.com/management/recruitinghiring-and-firing/should-i-rank-my-employees/ [https://perma.cc/7Q99-AULE].
41
Lawrence Mishel & Julia Wolfe, CEO Compensation Has Grown 940% Since 1978: Typical Worker Compensation
Has Risen Only 12% During That Time, EPI (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensation2018/.
42
. Dallas, Enron, supra note 23, at 37.
43
Carbone, Cahn, & Levit, Gender and the Tournament, supra note 13.
44
See Jennifer L. Berdahl et al., Work as a Masculinity Contest, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 422, 422 (2018).
45
See id. at 429 (observing that masculinity contests are “most prevalent—and vicious—in male-dominated
occupations where extreme resources (fame, power, wealth) or precarious resources . . . are at stake . . . .”).
46
Id. at 430.(observing that “men compete at work for dominance by showing no weakness, demonstrating a singleminded focus on professional success, displaying physical endurance and strength, and engaging in cut-throat
competition.”)
47
Id. at 428 (“The need to repeatedly prove masculinity can lead men to behave aggressively, embrace risky behaviors,
sexually harass women (or other men), and express homophobic attitudes, when men feel that their masculinity is
threatened.”).
48
See Peter Glick et al., Development and Validation of the Masculinity Contest Culture Scale, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 449,
449 (2018).
49
Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, Why Do So Many Incompetent Men Become Leaders?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 22,
2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/08/why-do-so-many-incompetent-men
[https://
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greater power diminishes functional empathy—higher social status and situational power are
“associated with a reduced tendency to comprehend how other individuals see the world, think
about the world, and feel about the world.”50 It turns out that these traits describe a distinct subset
of the general population that is much more likely to be male51 – and more likely to discriminate
against outsiders.52
Accordingly, corporate environments that place greater emphasis on zero (or worse, negative)
sum competition systems introduce a reinforcing set of effects. As law professor Donald
Langevoort explained, traits “such as over-optimism, an inflated sense of self-efficacy and a deep
capacity for ethical self-deception . . . are survival traits, not weaknesses, in a very Darwinian
business world.”53 Such business worlds tend to select not just for men, but for a certain type of
male leader, a type of leader who is also more likely than other men to drive women out. And
while bonus pay systems vary, they tend to be associated with greater gender pay disparities,
further affecting the ability to retain female employees.54
The net effect of these environments, which produce cutthroat corporate cultures, an
emphasis on long hours as an end in themselves, and the promotion of misogynist managers, may
literally be boys’ clubs. The McKinsey/Lean In survey of more than 300 firms and 40,000
employees found that the percentage of women decreases at every step along the management
pipeline, beginning at 47% at the entry level and ending at 21% of the C-Suite positions.55
This analysis above suggests that the presence of women – and often other
underrepresented groups – in upper management is likely to be associated with better firm financial
performance because of the dynamic described above. The most pernicious management

perma.cc/9QBH-ZW27]; (observing that “when it comes to leadership, the only advantage that men have over
women . . . is the fact that manifestations of hubris—often masked as charisma or charm—are commonly mistaken
for leadership potential, and that these occur much more frequently in men than in women.”).
50
Adam D. Galinsky et al., Power and Perspectives Not Taken, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1068, 1072 (2006). See also DACHER
KELTNER, THE POWER PARADOX 101 (2016)(identifying “The Abuses of Power” as: “Power leads to empathy deficits
and diminished moral sentiments;” “Power leads to self-serving impulsivity;” “Power leads to incivility and
disrespect;” and “Power leads to narratives of exceptionalism.”).
51
Emily Grijalva et al., Gender Differences in Narcissism: A Meta-analytic Review, 141 PSYCHOL. BULL. 261, 283
(2015); See Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of 'Pay for Performance,'
39 J. CORP. L. 2, 11, 35 (Mar. 2014).
52
Berdahl et al., supra note 44, at 435 (concluding that those who thrive in such environments tend to identify with
the workers who have the same traits they see in themselves, and to exploit others’ weaknesses, leading to the
“exclusion and harassment toward historically disadvantaged groups and men with resistant masculinities.”)
53
Langevoort, supra note 16, at 288 .
54
Mita Goldar et al., Rethinking Gender Pay Inequity in a More Transparent World, ADP RES. INST. 2 (Aug. 2020),
https://www.adpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/21032437/Rethinking-Gender-Pay-Inequity-in-a-MoreTransparent-World-Exec-Summary.pdf; Stefania Albanesi, How Performance Pay Schemes Make the Gender Gap
Worse, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/12/how-performance-payschemes-make-the-gender-gap-worse/.
55
McKinsey & Co., Women in the Workplace 2020, (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/featuredinsights/diversity-and-inclusion/women-in-the-workplace.
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techniques, such as earnings management, stock buybacks,56 and other practices focused on the
shortterm at the expense of a company’s long term health depend on the CEO’s ability to enlist
the support of a small group of insiders to subvert standard business practices.57 The CEO’s most
common way of identifying compatriots is through high stakes incentive pay that allows the CEO
to signal the desired performance and reward it, without being directly involved in questionable
behavior.58 Even if the company is not engaged in illegal practices, the internal competition pits
employees against each other, undermining cooperation and trust59 and often leading to the
promotion of what business psychology professor Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic suggests is too
many “incompetent men.”60
II. The Business Case for Diversity
The business case for diversity combines the commitment to diversity as a moral obligation
with the argument that diverse institutions produce better results. Promoting diversity, in
accordance with this argument, produces win-win outcomes; business entities can to “do the right
thing” and promote diversity at no cost to the bottom line. This argument has become increasingly
influential; it has led to efforts to mandate greater diversity on corporate boards. California has
joined a number of European and Asian countries requiring a minimum percentage of women on
the governing boards of publicly traded companies.61 Some jurisdictions, including California,
have gone further and added quotas for other underrepresented groups.62
The pure “business case,” however, faces two significant limitations: first, it is difficult to
prove that it is diversity per se that causes the improvements, and second, even if diversity in fact
accounts for the outcomes, an explanation is missing for why the appropriate focus should be on
diversity on corporate boards, rather than in upper management. This section examines the
existing empirical basis for the business claims in the light of the analysis in Section. It describes
the empirical work linking diversity to better business outcomes, acknowledges the
56

William Lazonick, Mustafa Erdem Sakinç, & Matt Hopkins, Why Stock Buybacks Are Dangerous for the Economy,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 7, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/01/why-stock-buybacks-are-dangerous-for-the-economy (“With
the majority of their compensation coming from stock options and stock awards, senior corporate executives have
used open-market repurchases to manipulate their companies’ stock prices to their own benefit”).
57
Carbone & Black, supra note 7, at 456-57 (describing the role of the CEO in creating “criminogenic” environments).
This is particularly true where the conduct involves plausibility deniability with respect to illegal or unethical conduct.
Id. (describing plausible deniability). Even where the conduct is perfectly legal and visible, as with stock buybacks
or layoffs, however, it may involve neutralizing internal opposition.
58
Id. at 469-70 (describing practices that give subordinates substantial authority without oversight).
59
. Dallas, Enron, supra note 23, at 37.
60
TOMAS CHAMORRO-PREMUZIC, WHY DO SO MANY INCOMPETENT MEN BECOME LEADERS? 172-73 (2019).
61
Anne Steele, California Rolls Out Diversity Quotas for Corporate Boards, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2020 12:01AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-rolls-out-diversity-quotas-for-corporate-boards-11601507471. See also
Jennifer Rankin, EU Revives Plans for Mandatory Quotas of Women on Corporate Boards, GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/05/eu-revives-plans-for-mandatory-quotas-of-women-on-companyboards. Other states have introduced legislation to increase the representation of women on corporate boards. Women
on Corporate Boards: Quick Take, CATALYST (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-oncorporate-boards/.
62
In this article, we focus specifically on women. Some of the argument we are making applies to other
underrepresented groups and some of it does not.
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methodological limitations, and concludes, that in explaining outcomes, the links between the
factors that promote pernicious business practices and those obstruct efforts to promote greater
diversity may be so deeply intertwined as to be impossible to separate. We conclude that the
factors we describe in Section I, rather than diversity as an end in itself, therefore form the core of
the instrumental case for diversity.
A.

Corporate Boards

There is increasing scholarly inquiry into whether diverse firms outperform less diverse
firms.63 The easy (and uncomplicated) answer appears to be that diversity pays; more diverse
firms, measured by the percentage of women on corporate boards, outperform those with fewer
women, when performance is measured by factors such as returns to equity or other measures of
financial performance.64 The studies, however, particularly once they attempt to control for
factors other than the mere presence of women, are not uniform in finding better performance. In
short, the studies do not (and we will argue cannot) demonstrate that it is the presence of women
per se that that causes better results.65 Instead, the arrows linking diversity to better performance
may run in multiple directions. It may be, for example, that better managed companies are more
likely to achieve greater diversity, rather than from diversity leading to better company
performance.66 It is also possible that the presence of women is associated with better management
practices for reasons that empirical studies find difficult to tease out. It is entirely possible that
better-run firms hire more women rather than that the women themselves necessarily cause the
better outcomes.67 The research that gained initial attention focused on corporate boards. Perhaps
the most influential of the early studies is one performed by Catalyst.68 This widely-cited study
examined Fortune 500 companies from 2001 to 2004, determined the percentage of women on the
63

See, e.g., Vijay Eswaran, The Business Case for Diversity in the Workplace Is Now Overwhelming, WORLD ECON.
FORUM (Apr. 29. 2019). https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/business-case-for-diversity-in-the-workplace/
64
Alice H. Eagly, When Passionate Advocates Meet Research on Diversity, Does the Honest Broker Stand a Chance?.
72 J. SOC. ISSUES 199, 201 (2016).
65
For a summary of the research, see id..
66
Juan M. Garcua Lara et al., The Monitoring Role of Female Directors over Accounting Quality, J. CORP. FIN. (May
30, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2732588 (“Using a large sample of UK firms we find
that a larger percentage of women among independent directors is significantly associated with lower earnings
management practices. However, we show that this relation disappears if we focus on firms that do not discriminate
against women in the access to directorships.”).
67
And there any number of other confounding correlations. For example, most studies find hat large companies have
more diversity on boards. Large companies may become large because they are better run or they may find it easier
to increase diversity by simply adding more members to their boards. Either way, the presence of more women may
not be the proximate cause of financial performance. See, e.g., Eagly, id. at 202 (noting that large firms have more
women on their boards and that the failure to control for firm size skews the results of some studies); McKinsey &
Co.,
Delivering
Through
Diversity
(Jan.
2018),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/organization/our%20insights/delivering%20th
rough%20diversity/delivering-through-diversity_fullreport.ashx#:~:text=We%20found%20that%20companies%20with,likely%20to%20experience%20higher%20profit
s.
68
CATALYST, THE BOTTOM LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION ON
BOARDS (2007), archived at http://perma.cc/ZP5N-PA3E (finding a positive relationship between gender diversity on
corporate boards and firm performance).
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firm boards, and found that companies in the highest quartile of female representation
outperformed those in the lowest quartile.69 The study, however, simply reported the differences
between the two groups without any effort to include control variables that might explain the
results, and acknowledged that the correlation could not establish that it was the presence of
women per se that caused the better performance.70 Indeed, the strength of the relationships did
not hold up in Catalyst’s follow-up study, looking at the same relationships during the 2004-2008
time period.71 A later Credit Suisse Research Institute Study looking at over 2000 firms across the
globe also found that firms with at least one woman on the board outperformed firms with all-male
boards, reporting that among firms with a market capitalization of over $10 billion, the firms with
female board representation had a 26% better performance in share price.72 This study, too, lacked
controls that might identify causal factors, and some scholars suspect that larger firms may find it
easier to recruit and retain female board members in ways that skew the results.73 A number of
studies have shown similar correlations.74
While other studies have found a positive relationship using more sophisticated statistical
techniques, some have not.75 Overall, “an accurate description of this extensive empirical
literature is that correlational findings relating percentages of women on corporate boards to firms’
financial performance are mixed, and on the average lean very slightly in the positive direction but
69

Id. at 1.
Terry Morehead Dworkin & Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of Gender Diversity in Corporate Governance , 21 U.
PA. BUS. L. 105, 107 (2018) ( “Some industry studies, like those conducted by Catalyst, include an explicit footnote
that ‘correlation does not prove or imply causation.’”).
71
See Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does
Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 384 (2014) (critiquing the study’s limitations).
72
CREDIT SUISSE RES. INST., GENDER DIVERSITY AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 12-16 (Aug. 2012), archived
at http://perma.cc/TC6U-FAH2.
73
Rhode & Packel, supra note 71, at 386 (noting lack of controls). See also Eagly, supra note 63, at 202 (speculating
on the impact of firm size on studies of this type).
74
For example, the Morgan Stanley Capital International found that U.S. companies with at least three women on the
board in 2011 experienced median gains in return on equity of 10% and earnings per share of 37% over a five year
period, whereas companies that had no female directors in 2011 showed median changes of -1% in return on equity
and -8% in earnings per share over the same five-year period. See Meggin Thwing Eastman et al., The Tipping Point:
Women
on
Boards
and
Financial
Performance
3,
MSCI
(Dec.
2016),
https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/fd1f8228- cc07-4789-acee-3f9ed97ee8bb (analyzing U.S. companies that
were constituents of the MSCI World Index for the entire period from July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2016). The 2018 Calvert
report found that, over an eleven-year period, “companies with higher percentage of Women in Leadership positions
(WLP) and higher [percent] of Women in Board positions (WBD) outperform companies with the lowest [percent] of
WLP and WBD as measured by ratios” for returns on sales, returns on assets, and returns on equity. noting that 33%70% was the critical number. Just Good Investing 11, CALVERT IMPACT CAPITAL (Dec. 2018),
https://www.calvertimpactcapital.org/storage/documents/calvert-impact-capital-gender-report.pdf. The report also
noted that it was not just the number of women in leadership or in board positions that mattered to returns, but the
ratio of women to men: “Once a borrower exceeds 33% WLP, we observe a more significant increase in financial
performance that tapers off around 70% WLP.” Id. at 12.
75
See Rhode & Packel, supra note 71, at 385-86 (summarizing the studies finding a positive relationship); id. at 387390 (summarizing the studies finding either no relationship or a negative one); id. at 384 (Rhode and Packel conclude:
“[d]espite increasing references to acceptance of the business case for diversity, empirical evidence on the issue is
mixed”).
70
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only for companies’ accounting outcomes,” though not necessarily other factors such as returns to
equity.76 In the international context, the relationship between female board representation and
market performance is stronger in countries with greater gender equality.77 The varying results
reflect differences in methodology, sample selections, and time periods.78
Relatively few of the studies attempt to tease out causation and doing so is difficult. For
one thing, “women” are hardly a single uniform category; the women on one board may not be
identical to the women on other boards. As a general matter, women appointed “to corporate
boards may not in fact differ very much in their values, experiences, and knowledge from the
men.”79 A study in 2019 by Crunchbase, Him for Her, and Kellogg Professor Lauren Rivera of
privately-held companies showed that women on boards are more likely to be
independent members rather than investors or members tied to management.80 This suggests they
are less likely to be either CEO acolytes or hedge fund activists pushing a short term agenda.
Accordingly, any rigorous study would have to look not just at the overall number of women, but
what type of women produced the best results – any women, the women most similar to the men,
or women who bring distinctly different perspectives?81
For another, the most important causal relationships, including those producing statistically
significant results, almost always involve multiple factors with different effects. This may be
intrinsic in this type of research because of the difficulty in ruling out endogeneity – the possibility,
for example, that an unidentified factor influenced both better financial performance and greater
diversity.82 Nonetheless, the studies that attempt to identify potential causal factors are intriguing
to the extent they identify characteristics that may be associated with alternative – and potentially
better – management practices.
The single factor that comes up most frequently in studies of the relationship between board
diversity and firm performance is increased monitoring. Adams and Ferreira found in 2009 that
the presence of women on corporate boards was associated with better attendance at board
meetings and closer company monitoring.83 The greater monitoring increased the likelihood that
76

Eagly, supra note 64, at 203 (defining accounting outcomes as profit and loss). See also Paul Gompers & Silpa
Kovvali, The Other Diversity Dividend, HARV. BUS. REV. (July-Aug. 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/the-otherdiversity-dividend characterizing the metanalyses as producing results that are “either non-existent (effectively zero)
or very weakly positive.”
77
Id.
78
Id. at 390 (concluding that “the empirical research on the effect of board diversity on firm performance is
inconclusive” and that the “mixed results reflect the different time periods, countries, economic environments, types
of companies, and measures of diversity and financial performance.”). .
79
Does Gender Diversity on Boards Really Boost Company Performance?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 18, 2017),
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/will-gender-diversity-boards-really-boost-company-performance/.
80
Ann Shepherd & Gene Teare, 2020 Study of Gender Diversity on Private Company Boards, CRUNCHBASE (Mar.1,
2021), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/2020-diversity-study-on-private-company-boards/.
81
See, e.g., Gompers & Kovvali, supra note 77, https://hbr.org/2018/07/the-other-diversity-dividend (describing how
homogenous venture capital firms tend to be, with Harvard Business School graduates dominating the firms).
82
Eagly, supra note 64, at 202. Investopedia defines an “endogenous variable” as “a variable in a statistical model
that's changed or determined by its relationship with other variables within the model.”
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/endogenous-variable.asp
83
Eagly, supra note 64, at 202 (referring to a study by Renée Adams and Daniel Ferreira and observing that women
board members had higher attendance rates at board meetings, were more likely to serve on monitoring committees,

14

CEOs would resign after poor company performance.84 The same study, however, also found that
increased monitoring was associated with weaker performance in stronger firms, producing a
negative aggregate effect.85 The authors could not explain the overall negative result, indicating
their inability to rule out investor bias in the stronger firms – or other unidentified factors – in
producing the negative results.86 The significance of the study, for our purposes, is that it found
that greater monitoring is correlated both with the greater presence of women and with firm
performance (both positively and negatively). What it did not explain was why the factor is
correlated with the greater presence of women, or why it produced stronger performance in weak
firms and weaker performance in strong firms. What it suggested, however, is that when more
women are present, more monitoring takes place, and more monitoring correlates with changed
business performance.
Subsequent studies have contributed to the explanations of why factors associated with
greater diversity such as monitoring might explain the relationship between diversity and stronger
firm performance. In its report advocating gender diversity, Nasdaq reviewed elements associated
with gender diversity that may explain the impact of diversity on firm performance. A 2015 study,
for example, found “strong evidence” that a greater number of women on boards was correlated
with less securities fraud.87 A later study suggested gender diversity is associated with stronger

and these factors correlated with more monitoring, and better performance at low performing companies); see also
Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance,
94. J. FIN. ECON. 291, 291-92 (2009) (describing the impact on board performance, and finding that while more
gender-diverse boards allocated more resources to monitoring, the “average effect of gender diversity on firm
performance is negative. This negative effect is driven by companies with fewer takeover defenses”).
84
Eagly, supra note 64, at 202 (observing that women board members had higher attendance rates at board meetings,
were more likely to serve on monitoring committees, and these factors correlated with more monitoring, and better
performance at low performing companies). One reason for the correlation between more gender-diverse boards and
increased monitoring is some indication that women may be more conscientious about attendance and demonstrate
greater responsibility for oversight efforts. Adams and Ferreira note:
Women appear to behave differently than men with respect to our measure of attendance behavior.
Specifically, women are less likely to have attendance problems than men. Furthermore, the greater
the fraction of women on the board is, the better is the attendance behavior of male directors.
Holding other director characteristics constant, female directors are also more likely to sit on
monitoring-related committees than male directors. In particular, women are more likely to be
assigned to audit, nominating, and corporate governance committees, although they are less likely
to sit on compensation committees than men are.
Adams & Ferreira, supra note 83, at 292. Other commentators have theorized that women have been trained toward
detail orientation and are more likely to “engage in constructive dissent.” Sandeep Gopalan & Katherine Watson, An
Agency Theoretical Approach to Corporate Board Diversity, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 17 (2015).
85
Id.
86
Id. (observing that institutional investors are often attentive to board governance).
87
See Douglas J. Cumming et al., Gender Diversity and Securities Fraud, 58 ACAD. MGMNT J. 34 (Feb. 9, 2015),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2562399 (analyzing China Securities Regulatory Commission data from 2001 to 2010,
including 742 companies with enforcement actions for fraud, and 742 non-fraudulent companies for a control group).
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internal controls over financial reporting.88 Some studies found correlations between the
percentage of women on audit committees and the better reporting results,89 while other studies
suggested that more female board members produced better monitoring even if women board
members did not sit on the audit committees directly.90 The Nasdaq report also found board
gender diversity “to be positively associated with more transparent public disclosures.”91 What all
of these studies have in common is that they found that greater diversity is linked with greater
transparency, more accurate reporting – and less fraud. Nasdaq concluded:
There is substantial evidence that board diversity enhances the quality of a
company’s financial reporting, internal controls, public disclosures and
management oversight. In reaching this conclusion, Nasdaq evaluated the results of
more than a dozen studies spanning more than two decades that found a positive
association between gender diversity and important investor protections, and the
assertions by some academics that such findings may extend to other forms of
diversity, including racial and ethnic diversity.92
In short, Nasdaq reported that firms with greater diversity were less likely to be engaged in the
practices most closely associated with short-termism and competitive pay: earnings management,
accounting manipulation and fraud, and the suborning of internal controls.93
An Australian study looked at different factors, finding that adding women to boards
strengthened a company’s willingness to take prosocial actions, which produced higher levels of
corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR, in turn, was positively linked to financial
performance. Once the study controlled for the CSR effect, the women’s impact on firm
performance became statistically insignificant. The study concluded that increasing CSR, not the
88

See Yu Chen et al., Board Gender Diversity and Internal Control Weaknesses, 33 ADVANCES IN ACCT. 11 (2016)
(analyzing a sample of 4267 firm-year observations during the period from 2004 to 2013, beginning “the first year
internal control weaknesses were required to be disclosed under section 404 of SOX” [Sarbanes-Oxley]).
89
See Maria Consuelo Pucheta‐Martínez et al., Corporate Governance, Female Directors and Quality of Financial
Information, 25(4) BUS. ETHICS: EUR. REV. 363, 363, 378 (2016) (analyzing a sample of non-financial companies
listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange during 2004-2011) (finding that “the percentage of females on [audit committees]
reduces the probability of [audit] qualifications due to errors, non-compliance or the omission of information.”).
90
NASDAQ, supra note 1, at 25, citing Chen et al., supra note 89; Aida Sijamic Wahid, The Effects and the
Mechanisms of Board Gender Diversity: Evidence from Financial Manipulation, J. BUS. ETHICS (forthcoming) (Dec.
2017); Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 2930132 at 1, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2930132
(analyzing 6,132 U.S. public companies during the period from 2000 to 2010, for a total of 38,273 firm-year
observations).
91
NASDAQ, supra note 1, at 27-28 (“Gul, Srinidhi & Ng (2011) concluded that “gender diversity improves stock
price informativeness by increasing voluntary public disclosures in large firms and increasing the incentives for private
information collection in small firms.”66 Abad et al. (2017) concluded that companies with gender diverse boards are
associated with lower levels of information asymmetry, suggesting that increasing board gender diversity is associated
with “reducing the risk of informed trading and enhancing stock liquidity.”).
92
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt
Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity 22, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Dec. 4, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasdaq/2020/34-90574.pdf.
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See supra discussion in text at notes 20-30, 56.
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presence of women per se, turned out to be the decisive factor on firm performance.94 Nonetheless,
although it is difficult to establish the causal mechanism,95 it appears that “female directors tend
to be less conformist and are more likely to exhibit activism and express their independent views
than male directors because they do not belong to ‘old-boy’ networks.”96 The relationship between
gender diversity and CSR is stronger than that “between gender diversity and company
performance.”97 This effect, as the authors of the Australian study suggest, may depend less on
the presence of women than on which women are selected. Nonetheless, the study finds that
greater diversity, whatever the cause, tends to counter an exclusive focus on shareholders to the
exclusion of other stakeholders who might affect the company’s long-term prospects.
These studies cannot tease out the effect women board members have on financial reporting
with any precision. Instead, the relevant factors the studies identify are associated with both the
presence of more women and better business performance. Any casual relationships are likely to
be multidirectional. Firms that operate in a more transparent way may be more hospitable to
diverse boards, and firms that diversify by bringing in board members through less conventional
networks – or simply networks less closely tied to existing management -- may find that their new
board members ask different questions and probe in different ways from board members who rise
through more insular networks. The issue of the relationship between board diversity and
performance may thus be more about openness to outsiders than about the inclusion of women
per se.98
B.

The Business Case for Diverse Management
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Jeremy Galbreath, Is Board Gender Diversity Linked to Financial Performance? The Mediating Mechanism of
CSR, 57 BUS. & SOC’Y 863 (2018).
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A primary purpose of corporate boards is monitoring, and abuses such as earnings
manipulation and accounting fraud cannot flourish once boards shine a spotlight on the practices;
at that point, a series of processes come into play that are likely to lead to reform of those
practices.99 Accordingly, to the extent more diverse boards are more inclined to look into the
shadows of corporate operations, the more likely they are to discover abuses – with benefits for
the long-term health of companies.100
The case for diverse management is more complex. Management sets the tone for the
entire company. As we indicated in Section I, corporate reformers have focused on high stakes
bonuses systems as a source of both ineffective management and workplaces hostile to diversity.
These systems, whether at corrupt companies like Enron101 or more conventional companies like
Microsoft,102 have been identified with greater distrust, higher turnover, lower productivity, lesser
diversity, and greater gender disparities in compensation.103 Such systems tend to emphasize
reductionist, short-term, transactional metrics: Jack Welch, for example, at the height of GE’s
earnings management era, emphasized how important it was that his managers “hit their numbers.”
At their worst, these systems encourage “masculinity contest cultures” that produce higher
turnover, sexual harassment, bullying and lower morale.104 The literature on diversity and upper
management should accordingly be interpreted through this lens.
The studies show that diverse management, just like diverse boards, creates value in
multiple ways: it leads to greater profitability, market share growth, and more inclusive
organizational cultures.105 These analyses, however, suffer from the same issues that affect studies
of corporate boards: the correlations have been repeatedly documented while causation is difficult
to establish. Like the board literature, they also point to certain management factors as potential
causal factors associated with both greater diversity and better firm performance.
Some of the most influential studies look at the relationship between diversity and
performance without controls that attempt to establish causation. The Wall Street Journal, for
example, in a 2019 study, ranked the diversity of S&P 500 companies and then compared the mostand least-diverse companies along various performance metrics.106 The top twenty companies,
with the greatest amount of diversity, had an annual return in share performance of 10% over a
99
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five-period and 14% over a ten-year period, compared to the twenty least-diverse firms’ returns of
4.2% and 12%.107
Three studies by McKinsey (published in 2015, 2018, 2020) show a strong association
between diversity and financial performance. The most recent such study focused on the
companies in the top quartile for gender diversity on management teams and found that these
companies “were 25 percent more likely to have above-average profitability than companies in the
fourth quartile—up from 21 percent in 2017 and 15 percent in 2014.”108 A 2009 study found that
racial workforce diversity is correlated positively with a range of economic indicators, including
larger market share and greater sales revenues, while gender diversity also correlates with greater
sales revenue and increased profits.109 A Credit Suisse study similarly “demonstrated that
investment returns are 10 percent higher at companies with policies inclusive of LGBT+
people.”110
A meta-analysis of studies, however, by Jeong & Harrison, looked at 146 primary studies
conducted in 33 different countries and found that “female representation in the upper echelons in
general is positively and weakly related to forms of long-term financial performance, but
negatively and weakly related to short-term stock market returns.” 111 The meta-analysis found
that there is a “short-term drop in stock market returns following the announcement of female CEO
appointments, “ rather than a response to firm performance.112 Overall, the meta-analysis found
that studies of upper management, much like board studies, produced mixed results; that is, once
appropriate controls were added, much of the increased performance from greater diversity
disappeared. There are, nonetheless, also intriguing indications of what some of the causal
relationships might involve.
The meta-analysis’s most important finding involved the comparison between short-term
and long-term performance. Short-term performance appeared to reflect investor bias.113 The
authors asserted that long-term performance, on the other hand, involved firm decision-making
that reduced strategic risk-taking and “explains why financial performance is improved.”114 They
found correlations between greater inclusion of women in upper management and better decisionmaking, postulating that the inclusion of women moderated the tendency of all-male decision-
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making groups to take more risks, in part because of the tendency of homogeneous groups to reach
more extreme conclusions.115
In explaining their conclusions, Jeong & Harrison hypothesized that it may not be women,
per se, but the impact of greater diversity on deliberations that creates the causal effect. Other
studies suggest that these results may be context dependent. In finance, for example, a major
purpose of hedge funds and other investment firms is to manage risk, and there is no suggestion
that women fund managers are more risk averse than the men in finance.116 Indeed, women-run
funds routinely outperform those run by men, with some observers attributing the differences to
better decision-making practices. 117 Economist Cristian Dezsö, one of those who finds that funds
run by women outperform those run by men, adds a different wrinkle to the analysis. His data
show that women in women-dominant groups take more risks than women in male-dominant
environments, suggesting that, freed from gender stereotypes, the women feel freer to do so.118 In
contrast with the Jeong and Harrison meta-analysis, though, he discovered that men also took
greater risks when more women were present. “Borrowing a conclusion from psychology
research,” he speculated that men in finance “feel threatened when they see females taking on
more risk. So, they respond by taking more risk, too.”119 Either way, these findings suggest it is
the dynamic of the group rather than the sex of the decision-maker that determines outcome
quality.120
Other studies of diversity find that these effects may vary by industry. In considering
innovation, for example, the findings may be particularly robust. One study found “a strong and
statistically significant correlation between the diversity of management teams and overall
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innovation.” 121 The firms with greater than average diversity on their management teams
“reported innovation revenue that was 19 percentage points higher than that of companies with
below-average leadership diversity.”122 The study did not just consider gender diversity, however.
It examined diversity across a number of different dimensions and found “the most significant
gains came from changing the makeup of the leadership team in terms of the national origin of
executives, range of industry backgrounds, gender balance, and career paths.”123 Hiring managers
from a different industry and hiring more women had similarly positive effects on firm
innovation.124 Other studies, looking specifically at new ventures, have also found a relationship
between a management team’s gender diversity and the innovation performance of the firm.125
Like the studies of board diversity, the studies focused on management find that openness
to different views matters. 126 They also found that “participative leadership” that encourages
“frequent and open communication” and fair employment practices contributes to effective
workplaces innovation.127
What these studies generally suggest is a contrast between the intense, competitive,
negative sum workplaces that characterize masculinity contest cultures128 and the more productive,
innovative workplaces that pay greater attention to employee morale.129 Economists George
Akerlof and Rachel Kranton, for example, have argued that workers who think of themselves as
insiders rather than outsiders require less in the way of extra compensation to produce desired
results and become less likely to game the compensation systems that do exist.130 They conclude
that “[w]orker identification may therefore be a major factor, perhaps even the dominant factor, in
the success or failure of organizations” and suggest that high stakes bonus systems are often
counterproductive.131 More conventional management theorists similarly emphasize factors such
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as engaging workers, staying committed, creating trust and keeping open lines of
communication.132
A meta-analysis of management styles, for example, found that for both men and women,
“transformational” practices that communicate a compelling vision and pay attention to
subordinates’ individual needs produce the strongest positive results.133 In contrast, managers who
rely on a “transactional” approach based on incentive systems, bottom line metrics defining
organizational objectives, and attention to problems rather than successes do not do as well.134
Women leaders were more likely than the men to adopt transformational leadership styles.135 The
study authors speculate that this may be true, in part, because transformational styles conformed
more closely to female gender stereotypes and thus women who adopted other styles faced greater
challenges from role incongruity.136 The authors conclude that the differences in leadership styles
may explain why some studies find women to be more effective leaders – the women who rise
through the leadership ranks tend to use (and may be selected because they use) more effective
techniques than the men; techniques, however, that work for men just as well as women.137
These studies suggest that adding women – and, indeed, increasing diversity generally –
can have a positive impact on corporate performance, but that it may not simply be the presence
of women per se that has the effect. Instead, it is the interaction of diversity with the broader
corporate context that produces the result.138 Indeed, recruiting, retaining, and promoting women
executives may require reforming the most destructive aspects of competitive business cultures
and that may account for a significant part of the reason for the improved performance associated
with greater diversity. 139

III. Diversity as a Tool of Management Reform
The current generation of corporate reformers advocates both greater diversity as an end in
itself and reforms that challenge shareholder primacy and its related emphasis on short-termism
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and bonus-based competitive pay.140 Given the lack of conclusive findings on the impact of
diversity in isolation, the classic justifications for greater diversity combine a moral case for
diversity (including those who have been systematically excluded in the past is the right thing to
do) and a business case for diversity (more diverse firms, at worst, do as well as other companies
and at best do better so there is no reason not to pursue diversity). This article, however, suggests
that while social science research cannot isolate causal links in a statistically rigorous way, it can
identify the circumstances in which management reform and diversity efforts are most likely to
reinforce each other.
A. Finding the Buried Bodies
The literature on corporate boards suggests that the correlations between greater diversity
and improved medium to long-term firm performance may involve greater monitoring and a lesser
incidence of accounting irregularities, earnings management, and fraud.141 Companies that expand
the number of diverse board members, particularly within a short period, may have to expand their
search efforts to find board members, breaking the insularity of some existing boards. And, indeed,
as we pointed out above, women are more likely to be appointed to independent board positions
than to be appointed either from the hedge funds engaged in activist investing or the management
board positions more directly under the control of the CEO.142
The impact of bringing in newcomers may be particularly great in companies that
“manage” earnings, cover up unfavorable developments, disguise unethical conduct, or engage in
legally dubious activities that create potential exposure to negative publicity, enforcement actions,
or other risks.143 Effective board monitoring is expected to police such activities; the creation of
more diverse boards may well have maximum impact in circumstances where diversity recruiting
increases the likelihood of effective monitoring or greater firm transparency. As we demonstrated
in Sections I.B and II.B above, women who make it to upper management often demonstrate
different qualities from the men who thrive in corporate tournaments. In addition, given the
paucity of women in upper management, CEOs may be less able to handpick women they know
well. So long as upper management is a boys’ club, women board members are less likely to
reflect the amoral, misogynist, narcissistic mindset that characterizes the corporate environments
ripe for reform. Over time, of course, women on corporate boards may come to reflect the same
perspectives as the men. Indeed, corporate board members, male or female, have innumerable
incentives to look the other way with respect to management irregularities. The push for women
on corporate boards may well come from the fact that it is relatively easy: firms can simply expand
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the size of the boards and add more women without significantly changing firm dynamics.144 Sam
Walton, after all, dealt with pressure to increase diversity in the eighties by adding Hillary Clinton
to the Walmart board.145 As the board’s first woman, youngest member and one of few lacking
business experience, she had little impact.146 The much more important changes in corporate
cultures would come from greater diversity not just on boards but in upper management.
B. Eliminating the Incompetent Bullies
While the stock market (and CEO salaries) have soared, conventional measures of firm
performance, such as increases in productivity, show that companies have performed less well
over the last forty years than they did during the supposedly complacent managerial era.147 A
global study of CEO efficacy indicates that CEOs of the shareholder primacy era contribute little
to improved firm function, with CEOs who are paid more not performing any better, concluding
that the results suggest that the performance of CEOs “tend[s] to follow the performance of their
firms.148 Although women constituted less than 10% of the sample, the authors found that “the
overperformance of CEOs in top companies is driven by female CEOs . . . [and] the
underperformance of CEOs in the worst-performing companies is mostly due to male CEOs.”149
At the same time, the literature identifying the factors that drive women out emphasizes
the same factors that depress teamwork and innovation: negative sum internal competition, lack of
trust, emotionally distant – or abusive – managers, and the lack of loyalty and commitment
between employers and employers.150
Business psychology professor Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic argues that, instead of
establishing gender quotas,
a more reasonable goal would be to focus instead on selecting better leaders, as this
step would also take care of the gender balance. Putting more women in leadership
roles does not necessarily improve the quality of leadership, whereas putting more
talented leaders into leadership roles will increase the representation of women.151
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That is, while firms seem quite willing to promote “incompetent” or bullying, amoral, and
narcissistic men, they are less willing to promote such women.152 Simply selecting more
competent managers would thus increase the percentage of women.
Focusing on a company’s ability to retain a more diverse workforce may help to identify
and reform toxic workplaces. A telling factor at Uber was the fact that while the company initiated
hired women as 20% of its workforce, that number fell to 7% given the company dysfunctional
management practices.153 Similarly, a sex discrimination class action brought against Microsoft
persuaded the company to eliminate its stack ranking evaluation system, a system that many
observers believe contributed not just to gender disparities but to Microsoft’s loss of its
competitive edge in designing new technology.154 The problems at these companies came to light
only when they became the subject of high profile sex discrimination complaints.155 Diversity can
be an effective barometer of management effectiveness.

Conclusion
Using diversity as an instrument of corporate reform requires more than adding a few
women and stirring. Corporate leaders, after all, are adept at window dressing.156 Nor is it simply
a matter of diversity training or increased sensitivity to cultural differences.157 Instead, it requires
taking the idea of teamwork and trust seriously. The areas in the economy with the greatest gender
disparities, including finance and tech, have turnover rates for everyone – and even higher rates
for women.158
152
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Conversely, the workplaces that best promote innovation are also more effective at
promoting diversity. The qualities that promote both diversity and innovation in such
environments are “fair employment practices, such as equal pay; participative leadership, with
different views being heard and valued; a strategic emphasis on diversity led by the CEO; frequent
and open communication; and a culture of openness to new ideas.”159
Along these lines, diversity should not just be a matter of adding a few women to corporate
boards. Doing so in one sense is easy; legislatures can require increased board diversity without
significant disruption to the corporate bottom line(or male careers).160 If diversity is important
to business performance, management policies, or gender justice, however, then the inquiry should
be extended beyond board representation.
And sustaining diversity requires a critical mass. Diversity is an iterative process that spurs
more progressive change.161 Once workplaces become genuinely more diverse from entry level
positions to the corporate boardroom, it spurs other changes that may have nothing to do with
diversity per se. In the instrumental view, therefore, diversity is both a result and an architect of
change.
The instrumental case for diversity we advocate in this Article concludes that better
diversity is intertwined with better management. Diversity is a signal both internally and
externally of a company’s values. While adding women and stirring has not yet been shown to be
a causal factor, the failure of a company to be able to maintain a diverse board or diverse
management is a sign that something other than path dependence or unconscious bias and
microaggressions is occurring at the company. Accordingly, for ESG investors who want to
reform management practices – short termism, accounting fraud, ripping off customers, low
productivity because of poor management – diversity is both a metric and a tool, signaling
problems or serving as a marker of change.
Corporate reform per se cannot address structural issues such as the lack of affordable
childcare or deeply entrenched racial inequality, but it can address the dysfunctional aspects of
corporate governance that have arisen in the shareholder primacy era.
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